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Since its emergence in the late 1700s, modern capitalism has been the focus of 
intense controversy. On the one hand, capitalist economic growth has been 
extraordinary. On the other hand, capitalism has been prone to crisis, and is also 
associated with a striking degree of inequality. Much of the political controversy is 
driven by conflict between those who have gained or stand to gain from the rapid 
economic development of capitalism, and those whose fortunes are threatened by 
capitalist advance and cyclical crises. 
  On the positive side of the ledger is the extraordinary productive power that 
modern capitalism has unleashed, combining land, labor, capital, and human capital in 
ways that have increased output and income at a previously unimaginable pace. Even 
capitalism’s severest critics recognized the great economic advances the system had 
wrought. As Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto, capitalism “has 
created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations together.” In the process, they wrote, capitalism had “rescued a 
considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.” 
  On the negative side is the undoubted fact that capitalist development can 
threaten the livelihoods of those who cannot compete with new technologies and new 
producers. Just as capitalism creates many winners, it also creates losers. Among these 
have been European craftsmen and farmers, undersold by new factory production and 
New World farming. The disaffected have also included countries in Latin America, 3 
 
Africa, and Asia, whose production structures proved poorly suited – at least in the first 
instance – for international competition. And today there are many workers, small 
businesses, and others, who fear the market and political power of the large 
corporations that have come to dominate contemporary capitalism. 
  Another aspect of capitalism that has drawn criticism is its tendency toward 
periodic crises. This has been a feature of the system since its inception, and although 
governments seem to have developed more effective measures to mitigate the impact of 
crises, they certainly have not eliminated them. Critics of the capitalist order point with 
concern to the expectation that modern capitalist economies will intermittently hit the 
skids. 
  In what follows, we survey political responses to the development of capitalism 
since the late 1700s. Throughout, we focus on the two principal sides of the debate. 
Capitalism’s principal supporters have been those who have benefited most from its 
development, or hope to do so. Capitalism’s principal opponents have been those who 
have lost, or expect to lose, as the system progresses. In the middle, often, are reformers 
who want to salvage what is best about capitalism while smoothing some of its 
roughest edges. While it is impossible to do justice to every part of the globe, we try to 
cover both the advanced industrial countries – Europe, North America, Japan – as well 
as the poorer countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
The mercantilist prelude 4 
 
  Modern capitalism arose out of an international economic order in which 
Europeans dominated the rest of the world both economically and militarily. From the 
fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Europe’s early-capitalist economies were governed 
by a mercantilist system that limited the operation of markets (see Patrick O’Brien on 
mercantilism, Volume 1: Chapter 12). These restrictions served to empower rulers, and 
to enrich or protect powerful economic interests. They were very successful at acquiring 
and exploiting colonial possessions for the benefit of the mother countries, and at 
channeling the energies of the budding capitalist societies toward the new 
manufacturing activities.  
  At the top of the European societies, the main champions of the mercantilist, 
early-capitalist, social order, apart from the rulers themselves, were the city-dwelling 
commercial and financial classes, principal beneficiaries of the systematic biases of 
economic activity. Governments at this early stage typically sanctioned monopolistic 
control over much economic activity, including overseas trade and access to colonial 
markets and resources. The monopolists – the Hudsons Bay Company and the Dutch 
East India Company, for example --  naturally backed the system. Some landowning 
elites gained from the new overseas opportunities – which many sent offspring to 
exploit. In addition, urban craftsmen and their guilds gained, for mercantilist 
restrictions on trade stimulated early local manufacturing by turning the terms of trade 
in favor of the mother country, especially by depressing the price of primary inputs and 5 
 
raising the price of manufactured output. Given its combined military and economic 
goals, mercantilism was a striking success, associated with Western Europe’s rise to 
global economic and military dominance. Yet it soon gave way to a more modern 
economic order. 
The industrial revolution, 1770-1850 
  The rise of modern industrial capitalism. Over the course of the 1700s, the new 
industrialism began to supplant the previous economic order in parts of northern 
Europe. Cottage industry and the “putting-out” system gave way to the factory system 
(see Harley on European industrialization, Volume 1: Chapter 14). Skilled craftsmen 
were replaced by water- and steam-powered machinery, which could be operated by 
less skilled workers,  including children, and which  required large amounts  of capital. 
The result was an unprecedented increase in industrial output. But the extraordinary 
productivity of the new industries caused problems for many existing producers.     
  As the factory system thrived, it drove many of the earlier manufacturers out of 
business. Handloom weavers, on the Continent as in England, were first pressed by the 
putting-out system, then by Asian imports, and from the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
by textiles produced in the British factories that had leapt to the technical forefront. In 
many weaving-dominated regions, mass unemployment and actual starvation ensued, 
most notably in Silesia in the 1840s.  6 
 
In the independent towns and principalities still dominated by guilds, the entry 
of capitalist modes of production and wider markets presaged a swift demise. The 
appearance on the European market of inexpensive mass-produced goods – textiles, 
shoes, apparel, toys, appliances – doomed traditional labor-intensive guild production. 
If the town admitted cheaper goods (even after paying high tariffs), the traditional 
craftspeople lost their customers. If mass-produced goods were excluded in an effort to 
preserve the local market, home-town consumers moved to areas that offered a greater 
variety of goods, services, and occupations, and again the traditional town withered. 
  Capitalism was more disruptive in many of the craft-based German towns than 
in England, France, Prussia, and the parts of Germany that the French had occupied 
under Napoleon, for there the guild system had already been abolished. These regions’ 
petite bourgeoisie was correspondingly less tied to traditional manufacturing for 
everyday consumption and more to shop-keeping and highly specialized, often 
luxurious, decorative crafts (furniture, tapestries, jewelry, wine, glass). Even so, in some 
sectors, notably again spinning and weaving, the impact was catastrophic even in these 
more “enlightened” regions. 
  Whether in England or on the Continent, the expansion of modern industry – 
and something recognizably like modern capitalism – gave rise both to movements of 
enthusiastic supporters and to groups opposed to the new social system. 7 
 
  Enthusiasts. The new manufacturing interests  were both the principal 
protagonists and the most fervent supporters of the new industrialism. The centers of 
the burgeoning factory system were to be found in the Midlands and the North of 
England, including such cities as Birmingham and Manchester; in  parts of Northern 
France and Wallonia, and in the German states (chiefly Prussia).  
  Entrepreneurs in the new industrial centers quickly recognized that what Adam 
Smith called “the mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system”1 were 
impediments to the full development of modern manufacturing. Mercantilist 
monopolies restricted entry to new economic actors, even (or especially) when they 
were more efficient. Barriers and limits to overseas trade sometimes restricted access to 
promising foreign markets. Agricultural protection raised the cost of inputs, and – 
inasmuch as food was a major part of workers’ consumption basket – raised employers’ 
labor costs as well. Where modern industrial production took hold, so too did political 
movements to curtail or eliminate existing controls on the new economic activity. 
  In Great Britain, the main early incubator of the new industries, two great and 
interrelated political battles marked the political coming of modern capitalism. The first 
was the struggle to reform the country’s political system to give more representation to 
the “middle classes,” originally defined as those in between the aristocracy and the 
peasantry, especially the town-dwelling business and professional classes. The 
                                                             
1 Smith 1776, Book Four. 8 
 
notoriously lopsided nature of British Parliamentary representation dramatically over-
weighted the countryside and underweighted the cities. Large landowners not only had 
their own house of Parliament, the House of Lords, but personally controlled many 
seats in the House of Commons by means of their influence over the so-called pocket 
boroughs. Neither Manchester nor Birmingham, by the 1830s cities of over 200,000 and 
100,000 inhabitants respectively, had a parliamentary representative of its own, while 
there were dozens of districts (“boroughs”) with only a few score residents. The most 
notorious of the rotten boroughs, such as Old Sarum, had few if any inhabitants: none 
of the 11 voters in the 1831 election in that borough lived in the area.2  Another, 
Durwich, was literally under water, the sea having encroached on almost all the land of 
what had once been a flourishing port town. 
  From the 1760s onward there were scattered attempts to expand the franchise 
and correct Parliamentary mal-apportionment, but – unsurprisingly – they received 
little support from sitting members of Parliament. The French Revolution hardened the 
opposition of those concerned that an enlarged franchise would only lead to that sort of 
catastrophe. But after 1815 pressures for reform grew, and the underrepresented 
regions roiled with protest and mass demonstrations, some of them met with violent 
repression. Perhaps even more importantly, the new elites of the manufacturing towns 
                                                             
2  The standard history of the period is still Woodward 1962, pages 25-=30 and Book I, 
chap. 1. For a (much) fuller account, see Buttle 2011. 9 
 
began to mobilize their wealth and influence on behalf of parliamentary reform. 
Eventually, in 1832 Parliament passed a Reform Act that substantially expanded the 
franchise (to about five percent of the country’s population), despite the continued 
opposition of many elite factions.3   
Electoral reform, once enacted, provided the opportunity for the strongest 
business supporters of the new capitalism to make their voices heard more effectively, 
and they immediately set about attempting to affect policy along these lines. The new 
representatives of the industrial areas were especially concerned about one of the 
principal issues of the day, repeal of the Corn Laws. These were tariffs on grain, 
originally imposed during the Napoleonic Wars, and by the 1820s a major benefit to 
British farmers. They also, however, raised the cost of food (“the dear loaf,” in the 
working-class propaganda of the day) and thus of wages. Perhaps just as important, 
supporters of Repeal believed that freeing British trade would help open markets 
                                                             
3 Even after the measure had passed the House of Commons, the landlord-dominated 
House of Lords threatened to reject it; their opposition was overcome only when the 
King, pressured by the Prime Minister and accommodationist Conservatives, 
threatened to create enough new peers to assure a majority for the bill in the Lords. The 
threat did not need to be exercised – once it had been credibly made, the existing Lords 
gave way – but this constitutional crisis suggested how high the stakes were and how 
much the balance of power had already shifted. 10 
 
abroad. This would happen both because foreigners’ enhanced ability to sell to Great 
Britain would increase their incomes, and their demand for British goods; and because 
they would be moved to reciprocate for British liberalization.  
  The impact of the protective tariff on the United States was prominently 
mentioned in the British debates. On the one hand, as manufacturer and free trade 
activist Richard Cobden noted, the tariffs reduced foreigners’ income and encouraged 
them to produce their own manufactured goods rather than buy from Britain: “We offer 
[the Americans] no inducement to spread themselves out from the cities – to abandon 
their premature manufactures – in order to delve, dig, and plough for us.” On the other 
hand, British protectionism reinforced the political position of the American 
protectionists. Home Secretary James Graham said in 1846, “We convert our natural 
and best customers, not only into commercial rivals, but into commercial 
enemies….They accordingly meet us with hostile tariffs; they impose high duties upon 
our manufactures.”4 
  After over a decade of bitter battles in Parliament, in the press, and in the streets, 
in 1846 Parliament finally repealed the Corn Laws. Again, the struggle was intense and 
enduring:  the Conservative Party split into Peelite (pro-repeal) and anti-Peelite (anti-
repeal) factions, and the breach was not fully healed until the Prime Ministry of 
Benjamin Disraeli (earlier the leader of the anti-Peelite faction, but by then resigned to 
                                                             
4 James and Lake 1989, 18, 20.   11 
 
free trade). The repeal of the Corn Laws marked the effective end of the age of 
mercantilism, and the beginning of an era of trade liberalization that became nearly 
synonymous with the rise of modern industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century. 
  In post-revolutionary France (once the Bourbons were finally displaced in 1830), 
strong elite support for capitalism came to the fore, at both the national and the local 
level. Pro-capitalist elites dominated both in the Orleanist monarchy (1830-1848) and in 
the Second Empire (1852-1870). Here, too, the crucial infrastructure for capitalist 
development was expanded:  harbors, canals, railways, sometimes drastic urban 
renewal (Hausmann’s rebuilding of Paris under Louis Napoleon). And in the Second 
Empire, beginning with the famous Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, France followed Britain 
in embracing free, or at least much freer, trade. In a particularly farsighted move, the 
Second Empire significantly advanced one of France’s important exports, wine, by 
imposing a standardized system of ranks and labeling that assured buyers of the origin 
and quality of the product.5 
  Elsewhere on the European Continent, nascent capitalists similarly pushed to 
modernize existing institutions, yet here the prevalence of pre-capitalist modes of 
production meant that electoral reform or a wider franchise were rarely seen as the 
                                                             
5 The phylloxera epidemic, which killed off so many of France’s vines, turned out to be 
only a temporary setback. To oenophiles, America more than repaid its debt to 
Lafayette by providing root stocks hardy enough to be immune to phylloxera. 12 
 
answer. While advocates of wider markets, deeper finance, and larger enterprises 
sought similar policies – an end to local protectionism, the abolition of the remaining 
guilds, rationalization of agriculture (to free up rural workers for urban industry), and 
low tariffs on food -- Continental industrialists often allied with “modernizing 
autocracies” to achieve those goals.  
  As early as the eighteenth century, some of the Continent’s “enlightened 
despotisms,” most notably the Prussia of Frederick the Great and the Austria of Joseph 
II, had prepared the legal and institutional soil for capitalism, unifying and 
rationalizing legal codes, guaranteeing judicial independence, weakening or abolishing 
guilds, and dismantling barriers to internal trade. Politically, the earliest leap toward 
acceptance came with the founding of the independent kingdom of Belgium  in 1830, 
which welcomed capitalist enterprise more than any other jurisdiction on the Continent. 
In post-Napoleonic Germany, and more particularly in Prussia, capitalist development 
was spurred by the Stein-Hardenberg reforms (1807-1811), which included abolition of 
most guild privileges, and by the expansion of the Zollverein, the customs union that 
embraced not only Prussia but an increasing number of its neighboring states: 
Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Bavaria, Hesse. 
  Intellectuals, particularly in England, sometimes reinforced the broad evolution 
of public policies more favorable to modern urban, industrial capitalism. The most 
direct connection was between new generations of classical British political economists 13 
 
and the new manufacturing interests. Thomas Malthus, James Mill, David Ricardo and 
Adam Smith all regarded mercantilism’s restrictions as barriers to economic progress, 
its monopolistic practices as impediments to the advance of modern industry. They 
preached the value of competition, specialization, and comparative advantage to a 
receptive audience of dynamic entrepreneurs. Among historians, Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, the father of “Whig History,” emerged as an enthusiastic supporter of the 
new, capitalist, expansive order. Across the channel, Physiocrats such as Quesnay and 
Turgot preceded the British political economists in their distaste for mercantilism and 
enthusiasm about competition and efficiency, although they saw farming,  not industry, 
as the principal source of productive advance. These new philosophical and analytical 
trends reinforced the broad acceptance of the precepts of modern liberalism, and its 
general sympathy for modern industrial society. 
  Opponents. The enthusiasts, for all their energy, faced substantial opposition. 
Mass sentiment in France seems to have been very skeptical of capitalism. To the 
peasantry, secure ownership of their small farms was the signal achievement of the 
Revolution. Peasants were eager neither to mechanize, nor to see their young people 
drawn away by industry, nor (above all) to accept large imports of grain. The 
Revolution had also enfranchised French peasants, so that  liberalization occurred only 
under authoritarian regimes (see above). It was peasant support that suppressed the 
Paris Commune, that later sustained the Third Republic and that steadily embraced the 14 
 
restrictions on retailing and industry that kept France a nation at best ambivalent about 
modern capitalism.6   
  Most visibly, in the areas where traditional guilds and artisanal manufactures 
had dominated, resistance was far stronger than in France or Britain. Handloom 
weavers and spinners rebelled and smashed machines in many areas of Germany 
(Augsburg, Silesia, Saxony), emulating but far surpassing the English Luddites. Other 
crafts joined in, at first demanding enhanced protection by way of the prohibition of 
imports from outside the locality, or of the revision or abolition of the Zollverein. 
Eventually they perceived that any effective remedy had to come at a much broader 
level, and sought in the revolutions of 1848 a unified and democratic Germany. The 
noble aspirations of the revolutionaries’ draft constitution of 1848 should not blind us to 
the fact that its major backers were the traditional craftspeople and that two of its 
crucial provisions gave the envisioned national government full authority to enact 
tariffs and to regulate trade and licensure. Had Germany achieved a democratic 
national government at this stage, the restrictions on capitalist enterprise would likely 
                                                             
6 Note, in Balzac’s novels, how few of his striving Parisian characters hope to get rich 
from industry, or even from commerce; how many, from government favors, official 
appointments, aristocratic patronage, or (curiously, but related to all of the above) 
artistic success. 15 
 
have been even more severe than those imposed by the democratic Third French 
Republic. 
  Many, if not most, European intellectuals and artists were opposed to, indeed 
often appalled by, the rapid rise of capitalism around them. Whether in industrializing 
England, post-Revolutionary France, or pre-revolutionary Germany, poets, playwrights, 
painters, novelists, can be counted as overwhelmingly anti-capitalist. In most of its 
aspects, Romanticism represented – despite its freshness of technique and its fondness 
for natural language – a visceral yearning for a lost, pre-industrial past. William Blake, 
most famously and most directly, saw “England’s pastures green” being displaced by 
“dark satanic mills.” But not by accident did Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony, a paean to a 
countryside untouched by industry or urbanization, rapidly become one of his most 
popular works. Wordsworth’s initial enthusiasm for the French Revolution7 yielded 
quickly to the rustic longings of Tintern Abbey, and, with his close friend Coleridge, he 
drew inspiration not from England’s cities, harbors, or commerce, but from the pristine 
Lake Country. And even the Impressionists, although capable of lyrical urban scenes, 
often focused on the traditional countryside of haystacks and wheat fields, often 
                                                             
7 To be sure, the French Revolution and the experience of Napoleonic conquest hastened 
the artistic longing for a more orderly and idyllic past; but, with rare exceptions, 
intellectuals sought a pre-industrial, rather than an explicitly pre-revolutionary, past. 16 
 
enough, once one notices, with a threatening, smoke-belching  railway looming in the 
background. 
  Even more directly, many poets and commentators (foremost among them 
Heinrich Heine8) sided passionately with the displaced Silesian weavers in 1844-45. 
Decades later, the Naturalist Gerhard Hauptmann produced a tear-  jerking account of 
their suffering, and of the horrid selfishness and hypocrisy of their capitalist employers,  
in his 1894 play, Die Weber (The Weavers). 
  Unionism. Industrialization, in addition to threatening many traditional economic 
actors and political and social traditionalists, created an industrial working class. This 
new working class began to organize itself almost as soon as it arose, and eventually 
became a significant political force in every industrial society (see Huberman, Volume 2: 
chapter 13). Its demands ranged from the purely economic to the broadly political, and 
from the mildly reformist to the openly revolutionary. 
  British workingmen began creating expressly political organizations in the 1790s, 
largely to demand greater rights, but these were largely suppressed in the general 
atmosphere of fear that followed the French Revolution. By the 1830s, when agitation 
picked up again, the character of the working class had changed. Those involved in the 
                                                             
8 Heine’s poem “Die armen Weber,” popularly retitled “The Silesian Weavers,” first 
appeared in Karl Marx’s newspaper Vorwärts in 1844 and was promptly banned in 
Prussia for its “subversive tendencies.” 17 
 
movements of the 1790s were largely craftsmen, artisans, and middle-class 
professionals, while the mobilizations of the 1830s and 1840s included large numbers of 
factory workers, a new category born of the previous decades of rapid industrialization. 
  British working-class hostility to capitalism – or at least to the form it had taken – 
was most clearly expressed in the Chartist movement. Chartism, organized around the 
People’s Charter of 1838, agitated for universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, and a 
range of other reforms that would have given the working classes much greater access 
to the political system. They gathered millions of signatures on two great petitions to 
Parliament, organized mass meetings around the country, and led strike waves, 
especially in the industrial North and Scotland. The Chartists were met with hostility 
and repression by the British government, especially while the Revolutions of 1848 
swept the European continent. Nonetheless, they directed national attention to the 
cause of more radical political reform, and to the new-found strength of the working 
class; and the Chartists arguably smoothed the way for the eventual adoption, over the 
next thirty years, of most of their proposals. 
  Early socialism. Other European revolutionary and reformist critics of capitalism 
were increasingly active in the 1830s and 1840s. This activism culminated, in most 
countries, in the multifarious Revolutions of 1848. In France and the German states, 
especially, the urban middle and working classes were prominent in demanding a 
greater role in political life. The revolutionary wave was very disparate, and did not 18 
 
affect some countries, but nonetheless it indicated that there were substantial sectors of 
modern European societies that were profoundly dissatisfied with the conservative rule 
that had prevailed. Almost all of the revolutionary onslaughts were resisted, often 
brutally repressed, and the aftermath of 1848 largely saw a return to autocracy. 
Nonetheless, a generation of Europeans had seen mass movements in opposition to the 
reigning political and economic order. 
  The proliferation of working- and middle-class agitation for political and social 
change between the 1790s and the 1840s was accompanied by attempts on the part of 
European reformers to address the glaring and growing inequality they observed as 
industrialization proceeded. British and French social reformers, in particular, 
developed both trenchant critiques of the poverty and inequality they observed in the 
new industrial societies, and suggested more cooperative and egalitarian alternatives.  
  Most of these reformers – ridiculed by Marx and Engels as “utopian socialists” -- 
pinned their hopes on the establishment of new cooperative communities that would 
illustrate the possibilities of a more just, but still economically productive, social order. 
Such French thinkers as Charles Fourier and Henri de Saint-Simon, and such British 
thinkers as Robert Owen, encouraged the creation of these “utopian” communities. 
Owen himself took over his father-in-law’s factory town of New Lanark, Scotland, and 
turned it into a showcase of this more humane industrialism. Fourier’s followers set up 
dozens of such communities (among them Brook Farm, Massachusetts, and Corning, 19 
 
Iowa, in the United States). Although New Lanark remained a model town for decades, 
most of the other utopian settlements lasted only a few years. Nonetheless, they 
provided reformist thinkers and activists with something of a model of what a different 
society might look like. So pragmatic a progressive thinker as John Stuart Mill evinced 
sympathy for Fourierist and other utopian socialists. Yet despite their broader appeal 
and impact, the movements were too small and isolated to have a profound effect on 
mass politics.  
  At the other extreme were anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist thinkers who 
argued for very radical change. Many of them, such as the Russian Mikhail Bakunin 
and the Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, largely rejected private property and the 
modern state in favor of self-organized producers’ communities grouped in loose 
federations. The early anarchists, in the 1840s and 1850s, mounted a powerful critique 
of the autocratic capitalism then prevailing, in favor of their “libertarian socialism.” 
And anarchism appealed to intellectuals and workers in some countries. 
  In the 1840s, as these socialist currents swirled throughout Europe, Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels began their collaboration. They were leading members of the 
Communist League, an organization formed just before the 1848 revolutions and made 
up largely of German workers living in England. Although the Communist League was 
dissolved in 1852, Marx and Engels continued to work with radical opponents of 
capitalism around Europe. They became influential among the growing and disparate 20 
 
groups calling themselves socialistic of one variant or another. Yet by 1860 there was no 
one dominant strand of socialist thought or action. There was, instead, a proliferation of 
working-class and middle-class reformers who shared a critical view of capitalism as it 
existed, and a desire to find a different way to organize society. 
The heyday  of modern industrial capitalism and laissez faire 1850-1914 
  The opponents of European capitalism in the 1850s were of the most varied sort, 
ranging from feudal romantics to fiery communists; but European capitalism itself was 
gradually converging on a path toward the early British model. In the years after the 
repeal of the Corn Laws, most of Western Europe moved toward the kind of 
international economic integration that was the foundation of British economic policy. 
Two pillars of this model were free trade and the gold standard. With the Corn Laws 
gone and mercantilism a dead letter, Britain was committed to minimizing barriers to 
international trade.9 With the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, as already mentioned, 
France opted for trade liberalization, and over time most Western European countries 
followed.  The Prussians, paradoxically, supported free trade with especial enthusiasm, 
                                                             
9 John Nye (2007) argues that the extent of British trade liberalization has been 
exaggerated; while his arguments are interesting, they remain outside the general 
historical consensus. 21 
 
since the dominant East Prussian landlords were highly successful exporters of grain10 -- 
a situation that would soon change.  Outside Europe, many New World governments 
also liberalized trade, and integration into world markets was the order of the day. 
Over the course of the 1800s, the trade of the advanced countries grew twice to three 
times as fast as their economies;  by the end of the century, trade was seven or eight 
times as large a share of the world’s economy as it had been at the beginning of the 
century.11 
  The international gold standard emerged and solidified along with, and as a 
facilitator of, trade liberalization. Britain had been on gold since 1717, and as the 
country cemented its status as the global market leader, it attracted other countries to 
use the same monetary system. Over the course of the 1870s most major industrial 
countries joined the gold standard, committing themselves to exchange their currencies 
for gold at a pre-established rate. By 1879 most of the industrial world had adopted the 
gold standard.  
The classical world economy of the 1850-1914 period, organized around free 
trade and the gold standard, saw a very high level of international economic integration. 
                                                             
10 The East Prussian landlords, as Barrington Moore observed, were at this time the 
rough equivalent of plantation owners in the U.S. South.  Both depended heavily on 
export markets, and both vehemently rejected protective tariffs. 
11 Maddison 1995,  38. For an excellent survey of the period see Marsh 1999. 22 
 
In addition to trade,  international financial flows grew rapidly -- foreign investments, 
largely in bonds and stocks, accounted for about one-third of the savings of the United 
Kingdom, one-quarter of France’s, one-tenth of Germany’s (see James on global capital 
markets, Volume 2: Chapter 12).12  International migration also grew rapidly, as fifty 
million Europeans and fifty million Asians left their homelands for new countries 
overseas. The international economy – and most of the world’s nations – grew faster 
than they ever had. Indeed, the world economy grew more in the 75 years from 1840 to 
1914 than it had in the previous 750.13 This performance may well have merited its 
common label as a Golden Age of capitalism, or as (from 1815 to 1914) the Hundred 
Years’ Peace,14 but the spread of capitalism and its development in this period had 
many critics. There was plenty to complain about – an agrarian crisis in Europe, colonial 
                                                             
12 O’Rourke and Williamson 1999,  209. 
13  The rapidity of growth is even more impressive on a per-person basis. According to 
Maddison 2001, page 264, world per capita GDP grew by barely 50 percent from $435 in 
1000 to $667 in 1820, and then more than doubled to $1510 by 1913. All data are in 1990 
international dollars. 
14 The sobriquet conveniently overlooks the expansionary wars of Prussia, the 
bloodshed of the Paris Commune, and the outright slaughter of the U.S. Civil War (in 
which probably one in every twelve adult males perished); but these events, 
admittedly, paled in comparison to the butchery of World War I. 23 
 
expansion in Asia and Africa, a Great Depression of prices that lasted nearly 25 years,15 
miserable conditions in the world’s industrial centers, limited or non-existing 
democracy – and there were plenty of forms this protest took. 
Enthusiasts. The principal supporters of the new order – both internationally and 
domestically – were again, not surprisingly, its principal beneficiaries. International 
financial, commercial, and industrial interests were able to take advantage of 
opportunities around the world, in an environment that largely welcomed global flows 
of goods, capital, and people. Within most countries, a consensus formed around the 
orthodoxy of the age. This orthodoxy privileged a country’s international economic 
relations, even at the expense of some national concerns. The consensus included a 
commitment to the gold standard, to respect for cross-border property rights, to strong 
involvement in international commerce, and in most cases to free migration of persons. 
In the developed nations of Europe and North America, this consensus was embraced 
by most economic and political leaders, as well as by large portions of the middle 
classes. and even among workers, especially ones whose livelihoods were closely tied to 
international trade and investment.16 Many European labor movements were, indeed, 
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nominal prices declined, especially for primary commodities. 
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supportive of trade liberalization – in part because it meant cheaper food, in part 
because it meant greater access to foreign markets for their manufactures, and above all 
because it steadily raised their real wage.
17 
In the poorer nations of the world -- Latin America, parts of Asia, around the 
Mediterranean -- the orthodox consensus was largely restricted to a narrow elite. It also 
was quite loose with regard to trade liberalization – plenty of business leaders, 
especially in North and South America, had no problem with protecting industry, even 
while generally favoring  both the gold standard and close commercial and financial 
ties with Europe. In any event, this internationalist elite typically exercised tight control 
over their countries’ political and economic orders. If there was dissent from below – 
especially inasmuch as the sacrifices made to sustain a country’s foreign commitments 
were imposed on those with little say in the matter – it was ignored or suppressed.  
Nonetheless, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed a 
remarkable convergence among the economic and political leaders of most of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
advocacy of silver), and most urban workers rejected Bryan and adhered to gold-
standard orthodoxy. 
17 Europe, relative to any other part of the world at that time, was abundant in labor:  
Central Europe had almost 120 inhabitants per square kilometer, Southern Europe 70, 
Northwestern Europe 55; East Asia, the next most densely populated  region, had 45 
inhabitants per square kilometer.  United Nations 1961, 41. 25 
 
world’s countries. Almost all accepted that an open international economy was highly 
desirable; and that it was sensible and advisable for their nations to adjust their 
economic policies in order to maintain their ties to the international economy. At times 
this might mean imposing difficult austerity measures on a recalcitrant populace. In 
extremis, even the most internationalist of ruling groups might find themselves forced to 
go off gold – as Southern European and Latin American governments did with some 
regularity. But the goal remained full participation in the British-led global trading, 
financial, and monetary order; and this goal was more often achieved than not. As an 
indication, by the early 1900s, virtually every nation of any economic importance – save 
only China and Persia – was on the gold standard. 
  The Statist alternative. If most of the world admired and emulated the British 
model of unfettered capitalism, we must note that quite a different way emerged in this 
period, one that turned out both to be extremely important and, in some cases, to have a 
dark underside. This was state-led, or state-stimulated, industrialization:  in its extreme 
form, state capitalism. Conservative leaders who saw the great advantages (not least in 
military power) that industrialization could bring, yet feared the social disruption it 
seemed inevitably to unleash, often decided to “guide” the process; and strong pre-
existing states permitted them to do so.  
  These “conservative modernizers” sharply accelerated the pace of industrial 
development by accumulating and channeling capital, often through favored banks, 26 
 
using state power to build infrastructure, and working in tandem with leaders of major 
industrial corporations. At the same time, to contain and defuse opposition in 
traditional sectors, these leaders pursued a three-pronged strategy:  (a) toleration or  
encouragement of a re-ordered system of guilds; (b) state provision of extensive social 
insurance benefits; and (c) severe limits on popular participation in politics. In short, the 
conservative modernizers constructed a powerful state that accelerated capitalist 
development, sheltered the most threatened traditional sectors, and provided extensive 
social benefits, but opposed democracy.  
  The almost ideal-typical example is Wilhelmine Germany (and, before 1867, 
Prussia) under Otto von Bismarck.  Even before Bismarck came to power in 1862, rapid 
capitalist industrialization had begun in Prussia’s Ruhr district:  coal, iron and steel, and 
above all railways developed rapidly from about 1850, the period now often called the 
Gründerzeit (Founding Era). Characteristically, the Prussian state invested heavily in 
many of the crucial early railways, but they remained under private management. The 
Ruhr’s rapid development intensified the conflicts that had peaked in the 1848 
Revolution, and the political threat to the existing order again seemed dire. While the 
Prussian monarchy had severely limited popular participation by the trick of retaining 
universal manhood suffrage (granted in 1848) while imposing a “three-class” electoral 27 
 
system that empowered the wealthy,18 even under that system the parliamentary 
representation of the mostly liberal Left steadily increased, until a majority of the 
Prussian state parliament refused supply: if the monarchy would not concede important 
powers, especially over the military, no money would be appropriated. 
  In this crisis, the King summoned Bismarck as Prime Minister. Bismarck simply 
ignored the constitution, appropriated the money (especially for the military), assured 
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direct tax they had paid in the previous year (most to least), and the total amount of 
direct tax collected in the district was also calculated.  Officials then proceeded down 
the list until one-third of the total direct taxes had been accounted for.  These were 
“voters of the first class,” and they were rarely more than ten per cent of the electorate; 
indeed, in areas dominated by large landowners, sometimes a single person.  
Proceeding on down the list until the next third of direct taxes had been accounted for, 
one attained a list of “voters of the second class.”  The taxpayers who provided the final 
third of total taxes (almost always the great majority of voters) were “voters of the third 
class.”  At the polls, each group voted separately, and not for parliamentary candidates 
directly, but (among each group) for three members of an “electoral college.”  After the 
popular votes were counted, the winning nine “electors” assembled and chose the 
actual MP.  Thus, in practice, the wealthiest minority of voters normally held two-thirds 
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himself of the support of the bankers and industrialists, and won a successful and 
popular war against tiny Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. Buoyed by this victory, 
Bismarck called new elections, won a parliamentary majority, and forced passage of an 
Indemnity Bill that retroactively approved all he had done. From that point he never 
looked back. 
  The foundation of all Bismarck achieved, including Germany’s rapid rise to the 
very front rank of European powers, was his scheme of state-capitalist industrialization 
at home. Together with his close friend, the brilliant Jewish banker Gerson Bleichröder19 
– who may fairly be called the “German Hamilton” – Bismarck reorganized German 
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invitations with Jewish friends, sponsored the ennoblement of leading observant Jews 
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The Grunewald development turned out to be personally lucrative to Bismarck, who 
(perhaps typically for the time) was not greatly constrained by conflict-of-interest 
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banking into a few large and interlocked conglomerates that could readily finance rapid 
industrial expansion.20 Bismarck also involved the Prussian state directly in the leading 
industrial enterprises (Krupp, Thyssen), worked closely himself with many of the major 
industrialists, and made sure that government smoothed the path to their further 
expansion. Perceiving, for example, that the monopolistic freight rates of some of 
Germany’s private railways were impeding industrial development, Bismarck (helped 
by Bleichröder) nationalized all of Prussia’s railroads by 1880 and all of Germany’s by 
1889. And, of course, the large manufacturers of steel and armaments found much to 
like in the ever-escalating expansion of German armaments, including – a point at 
which even Bismarck drew the line – a big navy. 
  To guard against any repeat of the guild-led insurrections of 1848, and indeed to 
bind artisans and shopkeepers firmly to the state, Bismarck reversed decades of 
Prussian policy and re-invigorated those guilds that a modern economy could 
accommodate. Bakers, pharmacists, grocers, booksellers, and many other specialties 
were granted local monopolies by the state and could legally combine to set minimum  
prices. 
  The state’s guarantee of monopolistic profits extended also to big business:  cartel 
agreements that divided up the market (e.g., for steel or sugar) and set a common price 
were legally enforceable in Germany. Protective tariffs, enacted in 1879, shielded both 
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East Prussian estates and West German heavy industry (“rye” and “iron”) from import 
competition.  While the system amounted to a consumer tax on the German economy, 
both Bismarck and Bleichröder were well aware that private wealth generated yet 
greater private investment; and indeed the titans of German industry plowed their 
super-profits back into their own industries and into the broader German economy. 
  The German state also directly subsidized research and development, not least in 
establishing the world’s first entirely research-oriented university system, with a 
particular emphasis on physics and chemistry. University researchers often worked 
closely with industrialists, and among the results were Germany’s early and almost 
total dominance of the world markets for synthetic dyes, industrial chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals. 
  Finally, to contain working-class unrest, and as he believed to increase 
productivity, Bismarck enacted the first state systems of sickness, old-age, and disability 
insurance in Europe, the beginnings of the modern welfare state. These measures had 
also an ulterior motive, openly recognized even earlier, when Prussia had become the 
first country in Europe to outlaw child labor in the 1830s: healthier workers made better 
soldiers, and German officialdom paid close attention to any rise in the rate at which 
conscripts were rejected for service on grounds of disability or infirmity. 
  Bismarck’s system of state-led capitalism spurred a rapid growth of the German 
economy. Total real output more than tripled in Germany between 1870 and 1913, 31 
 
against a rough doubling in the same years in France and the United Kingdom. Just 
before World War I, Germany produced as much steel as the rest of Europe put 
together, more than 90 per cent of the world’s output of synthetic dyes, and the world’s 
most advanced and successful pharmaceuticals. 
  Not surprisingly, other countries tried to imitate Germany’s success. Most were 
at best pale imitations – Cavour in Italy, the tepid efforts (already mentioned) of the 
Orleanist monarchy and the Second Empire in France – but one came close to 
succeeding and another overtook and surpassed the German example. In Czarist Russia, 
Count Sergei Witte, as Minister of Finance with far more absolute powers than 
Bismarck ever enjoyed, pursued the same path of rapid railway expansion, cartelized 
industry, protective tariffs, and forced-draft investment (much of it from, or subsidized 
by, the state). In Japan, the governments of the Meiji Restoration (also uninhibited by 
parliamentary institutions) imitated Germany even more explicitly, modeling the 
Constitution of 1889 directly on those of Prussia and Germany21 and adopting much of 
the German Civil Code of 1892 as their own in 1896.   Japan also imitated Germany in its 
state-led industrialization and its strong emphasis on heavy industry and armaments. 
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  Progressives and reformers.  On both sides of the Atlantic,  some “enlightened” 
members of the middle class deplored both the inequality and squalor of unbridled 
capitalism and the threat of working-class revolution.  While remaining committed to 
democracy, and sometimes even embracing direct democracy, they sought answers in 
regulation of big business and empowerment of the less fortunate.  Trusts were to be 
broken up (the Sherman Act) or constrained (the Interstate Commerce Act, the Food 
and Drug Act); factories were to be made safer, hours of labor limited, and workers 
given the tools to shape their own destinies (co-operatives, credit unions, settlement 
houses, even small garden plots for cultivation and a weekend escape from tenement 
living).  On the European Continent, these policies were associated with Left Liberalism:  
the reformer Schulze-Delitzsch (also a Left Liberal politician) founded producer and 
consumer co-operatives, while others advocated credit unions for small farmers 
(Raiffeisenverbände) or urban workers (Sparkassen) to encourage savings and provide 
what now would be called “microfinance.” 
  In Europe, Left Liberals (or Progressives; the two names were interchangeable) 
increasingly found common cause with Socialists, not least on the issues of free trade 
and more vigorous government regulation.  In the U.S., the movement reached its peak 
in Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912 run for the presidency as an independent Progressive 
candidate who framed the regulatory solution of the “New Nationalism.” 33 
 
  Middle-class reactionaries and proto-Fascists.  The solutions advocated by the 
Progressives hardly sufficed for the owners of small farms and businesses, increasingly 
doomed by capitalism and terrified of socialism.  Neither did traditional conservatism 
nor socialism appeal to these groups.  A substantial part of them turned, especially after 
1890, to a virulent and often violent strain of populist politics that rejected market 
economics and “cosmopolitanism,” dreamed of a restoration of the pre-capitalist order, 
and readily embraced anti-Semitism.  To many of these  groups, the threat of a new, 
unfamiliar, and more competitive world, and especially of a world market, could be 
attributed to one especially “cosmopolitan” group, namely Jews.     
  To these groups, it somehow followed that making Europe “free of Jews” would 
resolve all threats from capitalism -- or, for that matter, from Socialism – and guarantee 
return to an idyllic and pastoral or small-town past.  As the pioneering student of 
comparative Fascism Ernst Nolte first argued, these early anti-Semites and populist 
reactionaries focused their hatred on Jews as the embodiment of free markets, large-
scale finance, and international trade – in short, of a despised modernism.22 
  The strongest such movement, and indeed Europe’s first mass anti-Semitic party,  
was the Viennese Christian-Social Party, which drew on the organizational skills of the 
Catholic clergy and was led by the ex-Liberal Karl Lueger, who eventually won the post 
of Mayor of Vienna.  Lueger’s anti-Semitism was particularly virulent, as in his 1899 
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insistence that “the Jews here practice a terror as bad as anything that can be 
imagined.”23 The aspiring young artist Adolf Hitler, then living in Vienna, later 
confessed his “unreserved admiration”  for Lueger and his tactics. In Germany, an 
organized Anti-Semitic Party (or League) emerged as early as 1879 and struck deep 
roots in smaller towns, among struggling peasants, and among Berlin artisans.24  
Although it split and re-assembled continually, the movement was united in its 
opposition to liberalism of all stripes, and especially to Left Liberalism, which it 
denounced as “Jewified” (verjudet).   
  Relations between the populist anti-Semites and more traditional conservatives 
were complicated.  In France, the movement called Action Française, inspired directly by 
the Dreyfus Affair, wobbled between monarchism (albeit for the Orleanist claimant) 
and simple hatred of the Third Republic, dominated (as they saw it) by “metics” (Jews 
and foreigners) and characterized by an increasingly sharp distinction between Church 
and State.   
  Yet on the eve of World War I, the populist anti-Semites were on the wane, while 
Socialism was steadily rising.25  Indeed, Lueger won power in Vienna only on the basis 
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of a restricted franchise; the Social Democrats won, and expanded, a majority of the 
popular vote.   
  Socialist labor. Karl Marx, who died in 1883, would have been surprised at how 
quickly and completely the European working-class movements adopted his brand of 
socialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Friedrich Engels lived until 
1895, and he too would have been amazed at how rapidly Marxist socialism swept 
through European labor movements, and how quickly the labor movements came to 
influence European electoral politics. 
  The modern socialist movement can be dated to an 1864 meeting in London, 
which established the International Workingmen’s Association (often called the First 
International). The organization eventually came to comprise a wide variety of radicals 
from around Europe, including trade unionists, republicans, nationalists and anarchists. 
While the relationship between the First International and the various national 
movements was sometimes weak, its activities reflected the gradual rise of a serious, 
organized movement in opposition to capitalism, one that found substantial support 
among working-class and middle-class reformers and revolutionaries. 
  The culminating moment of the First International’s epoch was the Paris 
Commune, which ruled the French capital for a couple of months in spring 1871 in the 
aftermath of Prussia’s humiliating defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War. The 
Commune – and similar uprisings in some other French cities – represented a 36 
 
thoroughgoing challenge to the rule of Europe’s conservative political and economic 
elites. Its violent suppression stifled the socialist movement, and the experience 
contributed to a major split between the followers of Marx and the organization’s large 
anarchist membership. In 1876, the First International disbanded. Despite repression 
and the end of the International, there was little question that the underlying sources of 
support for the socialists and related revolutionaries remained. 
  Over the course of the next few years, socialist parties gradually organized 
around Western Europe. The most important developments were in Germany, where a 
merger of existing organizations created the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) 
in 1869 and the Socialist Workers’ Party (SAP) in 1875. Although Bismarck’s anti-
socialist laws made the party illegal a few years later,
26 it continued to grow over the 
next decade. Meanwhile, socialist parties of one sort or another were forming all over 
Europe – in Denmark in 1876, Belgium in 1885, Norway in 1887, and Austria in 1889. In 
July 1889, representatives from two dozen countries met in Paris to create a new 
Socialist (or Second) International. By then, many of the constituent parties were 
significant political forces in their homelands. Within a year, the newly legal and newly 
renamed Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or 
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SPD) was receiving 19.7 percent of the vote in national elections, more than any other 
party and almost double what it had won in elections only three years earlier.27 
  The movement signaled its sympathy for Marxist ideas by electing Friedrich 
Engels as its honorary chairman in 1893. Engels returned the favor by accepting, shortly 
before his death in 1895, that times had changed so much that “We, the ‘revolutionaries,’ 
the ‘overthrowers’ — we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal 
methods and overthrow.”
28  The socialists’ electoral successes were having much more 
impact than the illegal and conspiratorial methods of the past. By this point, the socialist 
parties and movements were primarily concerned to reform the capitalist system, even 
if many of their leaders and followers believed in the desirability and inevitability of its 
eventual overthrow. A combination of labor organization and electoral mobilization 
turned out to be remarkably successful at making the socialists central players in the 
rapidly democratizing political systems of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. However, socialists and other radicals remained relatively weak in most of 
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the Areas of Recent Settlement, for reasons that probably combined economic, political, 
and cultural factors.  
  On the eve of World War One, socialist parties and their related trade unions 
were among the most powerful political forces in most Western European countries. At 
their pre-war peak, socialist parties were getting between 15 and 25 percent of the vote 
in  France, Italy, and Austria; and 30 to 35 percent of the vote in Belgium, Germany, and 
Scandinavia.29 In 1916, Finland’s socialists received a remarkable 47 percent of the vote, 
which gave them a parliamentary majority and allowed them to form the national 
government as it prepared for independence from Russia (Sassoon 1996, page 10) Some 
of the most theoretically consistent, internationally unified, and extreme opponents of 
the classical capitalist order seemed to have arrived at the gates of the fortress, whose 
defenders were in any event thinning rapidly and often enough on the verge of panic.  
    Globalizing capitalism in the rest of the world – 1870-1914 
  Modern industrial capitalism spread rapidly from its northwestern European 
origins, finding especially fertile soil in the Areas of Recent Settlement (see Allen, 
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Volume 2: Chapter 8). These were regions that either had sparse populations when 
Europeans arrived, or whose populations had been decimated by the arrival of 
Europeans (purposely or not): the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
southern cone of Latin America (Argentine, Chile, Uruguay, southern Brazil). There 
were other regions outside Europe that also took enthusiastically to the new 
international economic order. Most took advantage of booming European demand for 
primary products; many tapped the great European financial markets for capital. Some 
began a rapid route toward industrialization themselves, both by more or less natural 
means and with the help of protective government policies. 
  Enthusiasts. There is little mystery in the expansion of modern capitalist 
economic and political patterns to many of the Areas of Recent Settlement (ARS): they 
were former or current British colonies and simply replicated British socio-economic 
and political patterns, adapted to local conditions. 
  It is a bit more complicated to explain how and why other regions so easily 
accepted the pillars of the classical international economy, the gold standard and free 
trade. In some, such as the southern cone of Latin America, the socio-economic 
structure was roughly similar to that in the English-speaking ARS. They had ample 
supplies of fertile temperate land, ideally suited for growing wheat or raising cattle. 
Once advances in the technologies of transportation (and eventually refrigeration) made 
it feasible to ship wheat and beef from South America to Europe, production in these 40 
 
regions grew dramatically. In the early 1880s, Argentina exported only 1.6 million 
bushels of wheat – barely one percent of U.S. exports; on the eve of World War One, less 
than 30 years later, Argentine wheat exports were  93.6 million bushels, over 85 percent 
of U.S. exports. The growth in Australian and Canadian wheat exports was 
comparable.
30 As the economies of these countries were completely reoriented, so too 
were their political economies largely remade to place the beneficiaries of links to 
European markets at the centers of power. 
  In these Areas of Recent Settlement – whether present or former English colonies , 
or booming South American temperate resource exporters – national economic and 
political elites were closely aligned with global economic interests, and closely allied 
with the centers of the classical world economy, London in particular. The economic 
policies they favored, and were typically able to have adopted, were aimed at securing 
access to European markets, European goods, and European capital on the best possible 
terms. This usually meant adhering to the gold standard, pursuing “reasonable” 
macroeconomic policies, and maintaining relatively open markets. It did not necessarily 
mean free trade: most of these countries had high tariffs on manufactures, for some 
combination of revenue and special-interest reasons.
31 Nonetheless, there was little 
question about elite commitment to participation in the global economy. 
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  Along similar lines, there were a number of European colonial possessions for 
which the golden-age expansion had strong positive effects –at on powerful local 
groups. Parts of South and Southeast Asia and West Africa tapped into world markets 
for tea, rice, and rubber, and for cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil. Some of the farmers 
who prospered as a result were European settlers; but in many instances, local elites 
developed around the lucrative colonial trade.32 
  Another group of reasonably enthusiastic members of the classical club was 
made up of countries that began the period in a semi-industrial state and wanted to 
catch up to the European capitalist centers. This included countries on the European 
periphery – Spain, Russia, Austria-Hungary – as well as some farther afield, such as 
Japan. While all these countries’ governments had some reservations about the way the 
world economy was ordered – and in particular their relative weakness in that order – 
they were all eager to join the ranks of the industrialized world.  
  Japan, as we have already noted, was an especially enthusiastic emulator of the 
Western model.  Horrified by the nearby experience of growing Chinese subjugation to 
the West, the Meiji leaders regarded rapid economic growth as essential to continued 
Japanese independence. Importing Western technologies, they also funneled state funds 
into investment; forbidden by treaties to raise tariffs, they subsidized domestic 
monopolies that taxed domestic consumers to provide yet more capital for investment.  
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Railroads, shipping facilities, steel mills, coal mines all sprang up rapidly.  Japan’s 
results also paralleled those of Germany:  between 1870 and 1913, real Japanese total 
output almost tripled.33 
  Rejectionists. Not all of the developing world was enthusiastic about participation 
in the classical capitalist world economy. The world’s most populous country, China, 
was particularly reluctant to subordinate its long-standing insularity to the needs of 
international economic engagement. China’s imperial government regarded modern 
economic growth as a threat to its authority, both because it would create powerful 
business interests that might challenge the bureaucracy and its landed supporters, and 
because it would inevitably open the country and its people to foreign influence. The 
Chinese central government tried continually to limit the impact of foreign powers, and 
foreign businesses, on Chinese society. While this was often justified on nationalist 
military grounds, it is hard to see how retarding economic growth did anything but 
accelerate the country’s descent into diplomatic degradation. And even when it came to 
purely domestic measures to encourage economic growth, the Chinese government 
lagged seriously – development of the country’s railroad system was two or three 
decades behind that of Japan or India. 
  India, with rare exceptions, resisted capitalism for the simpler reason that it 
experienced it in the form of exploitative colonialism.  The British East India Company, 
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chartered in 1600 by Elizabeth I and subsequently granted both a monopoly of trade 
and extensive powers of rule and taxation, had come by 1813 to control, either directly 
or through vassal princes, all of the subcontinent except the Punjab, Sindh, and Nepal.  
The Company’s exploitation, via unequal terms of trade, heavy land taxes, and a legal 
regime that privileged the British and their allies, supposedly came to an end in 1858, 
when Parliament, outraged by the Sepoy Mutiny against the Company’s misrule, 
passed the Government of India Act, nationalized the company, and imposed direct 
British rule on the whole subcontinent (again, excepting the princely states).34  
  Direct rule, including the institution of the highly professional Indian Civil 
Service, was less corrupt and brought significant improvements in infrastructure; yet, as 
E. J. Hobsbawm put it succinctly, India “was the one part of the British Empire to which 
laissez-faire never applied.”35  Instead, it remained a captive market for British 
manufactured goods, especially cotton textiles, where the Indian market accounted by 
the 1880s for over forty per cent of Britain’s total exports of such goods.36 India was also 
a major revenue source for the Crown via so-called “Home Charges,” India’s fee for 
being administered by Britain. Above all, it was a supplier of such raw materials as 
wheat, cotton, and jute to British industry.  A variety of policies discouraged the 
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development of domestic industry.  Two results were clear:  India’s economic growth 
was much slower (total output increased by only about 60 per cent between 1870 and 
1914,37 versus the tripling that Japan experienced in the same period); and India, more 
than other less-developed regions, experienced recurrent large-scale famines, e.g., in 
1876-78, 1896-97,and 1899-1900.   
Capitalism between the wars, 1918-1939 
  World War I was a turning point in the development of modern capitalism. To be 
sure, most of the trends that characterized the capitalist world after 1918 were present 
in 1914; but the war and its aftermath heightened virtually all aspects of the system, 
including some of the more troubling. Before 1914, the core parties and movements of 
both Right and Left were oppositional but not radical; there were mainstream 
movements on both sides that strove to remake capitalism in a different image. But 
there were few serious supporters of a radical break from the capitalist order, and these 
few had little influence. 
  After 1918, all that changed. As the interwar period wore on, it became 
increasingly evident that the classical capitalist order that had prevailed before World 
War I could not be restored. Radical movements of both Right and Left developed and 
grew stronger, in the face of the obvious failures of any semblance of a centrist capitalist 
consensus. The results were disastrous. 
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  Enthusiasts and their failures. In the aftermath of the wartime breakdown of the 
world economy, the political and economic leaders of most of the world’s principal 
nations shared an interest in restoring the pre-war international economic order. 
Classical capitalism had worked reasonably well, and there was little reason to abandon 
it. Elites in virtually every developed society continued to support open trade relations, 
easy cross-border capital movements, and the monetary stability of the gold standard. 
And so in the years after World War One, the major powers endeavored to restore the 
open international order of the pre-1914 era. 
  And yet every attempt to reconstitute the classical international economy failed. 
Despite continuing rounds of meetings, conferences, and consultations, the signing of 
agreements, and the establishment of new international institutions, it seemed 
impossible to restore the pre-war international economic order. The brief return to 
relative normalcy after 1924 collapsed as soon as recession hit in 1929, with devastating 
effect. 
  Many forces led to the failure of interwar capitalism, but there was no real 
shortage of enthusiasts who favored a restoration of some form of open capitalist 
system.38 There were supporters of open trade relations and free capital movements 
everywhere – and they often dominated the making of economic policy. The same was 
true of the gold standard. When the United Kingdom returned to gold at the pre-war 
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exchange rate in 1925, the overwhelming weight of established opinion around the 
world saw this as a normal and natural thing to do.39 However, as Keynes argued at the 
time, and  subsequent analysis has largely confirmed, the commitment to a restoration 
of pre-1914 conditions ignored the very substantial economic, social, and political 
changes that the industrial nations had undergone in the interim.
40 
  Some of the enthusiasts remained firmly committed to gold-standard orthodoxy, 
even after the collapse of the 1930s, and indeed blamed the prolonged Depression on 
the failure to adhere to the gold standard. Others, who came to the fore during the 
Depression, were strong supporters of open markets at home and abroad but were 
willing to make compromises to sustain them. The center-right and center-left in 
Europe – largely Christian Democrats on the one side and Social Democrats on the 
other – shared the view that capitalism was better than the authoritarian alternatives at 
either extreme. So too did America’s New Dealers and analogous political movements 
(in or out of government) in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And these less 
orthodox defenders of capitalism tried to navigate a middle ground that maintained or 
restored some semblance of economic openness, on the one hand, and that permitted a 
politically desirable degree of government involvement in the economy in times of 
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crisis, on the other.
41 In much of Western Europe and the Anglo-American world, this 
sort of compromise was reasonably successful – and presaged the post-World War Two 
settlement – but it failed miserably elsewhere. 
  Rejectionists and their successes. As capitalist orthodoxy failed, and as halting 
attempts to find another liberal way forward stalled, extreme alternatives came to the 
fore. From the vantage point of the late 1930s, traditional capitalist forms of economic 
organization seemed outmoded, and certainly outnumbered. The wave of the future 
appeared to be semi-autarkic, authoritarian, command-style economies, of the fascist or 
communist variety. 
  Fascism.  World War I fundamentally re-ordered world capitalism and put its 
various regions on divergent paths.   The U.S., Japan, and Latin America, spared from 
the brunt of the conflict and able to purvey crucial supplies and credit to the belligerent 
powers, prospered. The United States in fact went from being the world’s greatest 
debtor to its largest creditor. However, the war-ravaged states of Europe were bankrupt, 
saddled with debts and, in the case of Germany, reparations, they could not repay 
except by destroying their own economies.  But these were not their only burdens.  
Wartime  demand had built overcapacity in such armaments-related industries as steel, 
and had created whole new sectors (synthetic nitrates, for gunpowder and fertilizer) 
that now lobbied for protection that would preserve their wartime domestic monopolies. 
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Wartime hatreds, sometimes coupled with long-simmering nationalist resentments , 
amplified the demand for tariff barriers and self-sufficiency.  Vast numbers of 
demobilized troops, many of whom had served at the front for as long as four years, 
returned home to face unemployment, families they barely knew, societies that had 
changed fundamentally (or that they had outgrown).42  A younger generation of males, 
just short of military age, grew up fatherless – their fathers were either dead or had 
been perpetually at the front – and obsessed with the propaganda of wartime heroism.   
At the same time, women moved into non-traditional occupations, particularly in 
industry, to replace the male conscripts. 
   Moreover, wartime shortages of labor, regime acquiescence in the growth of 
trade unions, and the example of the Bolshevik Revolution had radicalized the working 
class, while postwar repudiation of public debts, whether explicit or via inflation, 
impoverished much of the respectable middle class.   
  All of this proved an exceedingly toxic brew.  First in Italy and Portugal, then in 
Germany and Austria, still later in Spain and much of Central Europe, the dispossessed 
middle class and peasantry rallied around movements led by war veterans, staffed in 
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their middle ranks by the men who had been too young to serve, and obsessed with 
hyper-nationalism, anti-modernism,43 and (in most cases) anti-Semitism.  
  The new fascist  movements purveyed the machismo and the authoritarian 
leadership of the wartime front. They were  fanatically anti-Socialist and anti-
Communist, seeking national glory and conquest, and (often as a corollary) advocating 
a rigidly autarkic economic policy, Fascism offered simplistic and seemingly efficient 
answers to the anxieties of the postwar peasantry and middle class. Replace disorderly 
democracy with tough and hierarchical leadership, re-establish traditional patriarchy, 
break trade-union power, exclude threatening imports, preserve traditional agriculture, 
restore national pride, and if necessary conquer sources of needed raw materials. These 
appeals enjoyed a burst of popularity in the immediate postwar chaos (and, indeed, 
carried Fascism to power in Italy in 1922), waned as prosperity and trade partially 
revived in the mid-1920s, and then again won both popular and elite support as the 
world economy fell into Depression and autarky after 1929. 
  While Fascist movements were many –they arose even in Britain and the U.S.– 
they achieved the “totalitarian” power they aspired to in only a few countries, most 
notably Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan. Only in Germany did Fascism originally 
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achieve substantial electoral support, but once in power and able to display significant 
achievements in foreign and economic policy, Fascism often won enthusiastic popular 
support, particularly of course among its beneficiaries:  the peasantry, the traditional 
middle classes, the military.   
  Germany is of particular interest because we know, or can reliably infer, much 
more about who supported Fascism – or, more precisely, who did not, at least so long as 
elections remained free and fair. At both the national and the district level, Catholic and 
working-class voters remained almost wholly immune to Fascist appeals. As economic 
conditions worsened, many Socialist voters shifted to Communism, but in very few 
cases to Fascism.  German Catholics, under clerical pressure, remained doggedly loyal 
to their traditional Center Party. Rather, the Nazi vote rose almost in direct proportion 
to declines in  the traditional middle-class Liberal parties, above all the right-liberal 
German People’s Party (DVP) of Stresemann and the left-liberal German Democratic 
Party (DDP) of Rathenau.
44 Fascism appears also, rather late in the game, to have 
siphoned off about half of traditional monarchist support (the German National 
People’s Party, or DNVP, which the press lord Hugenberg  enthusiastically supported), 
and to have won some new support from previous non-voters.  Those constituencies, 
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however, paled in comparison to the hordes of previous Liberal voters who went over 
to the Nazis.  It was this “treason of the Liberals” that led Seymour Martin Lipset, 
somewhat misleadingly, to classify Fascism as an “extremism of the Center.”45 So far as 
we can tell, Fascism in most other countries drew its strongest support from the 
traditional Right – albeit, admittedly, mostly from the middle-class supporters of the 
traditional Right. 
  Did Fascism support, or oppose, capitalism?  While it certainly opposed (and 
expropriated) “Jewish capitalism,” Fascism readily collaborated with each country’s 
major industrial firms and trusts, especially those crucial to its plans for territorial 
expansion and aggression:  steel, armaments, aircraft, energy, chemicals, and 
construction. At the same time, the Fascist regimes did not hesitate to seize firms that 
resisted their plans or carried them out too slowly; they frequently founded state-
owned firms in sectors they deemed especially important ; and, above all, they 
renounced capitalist orthodoxy about free international trade, ruthlessly pursuing 
autarky, even when doing so condemned millions to hunger, starvation, or the more 
“humane” route of extermination.46  Moreover, in pursuit of their anti-modernist vision 
of society, the Fascists excluded from the industrial workforce, to the extent possible, 
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important segments of the population – especially women and peasants – even when 
doing so compromised their wartime efficiency. 
  The Fascist efforts at world domination seem, in retrospect, audacious to the 
point of foolhardiness: taken together, the Fascist powers had even at the height of their 
conquests nothing like the industrial capacity of the United States and the British 
Empire or the manpower of the Soviet Union. That said, it must be admitted that they 
came perilously close to winning, and that such a victory would have altered capitalism 
to the point of destroying it.  
The interwar experience is a striking illustration of how the failures of capitalism, 
and particularly the wars that disrupt it, can inspire rabid and highly destructive 
resistance to it (see Harrison on war, Volume 2: Chapter 4). Nonetheless, the complete 
defeat of Fascism by 1945 set the stage for a triumphal revival of world capitalism, this 
time under American leadership, and indeed for a “Golden Age” of economic growth, 
social peace, and expansion of the welfare state in most capitalist countries.  The darker 
side of the victory was that capitalism now faced a more effective and determined 
opponent, Stalinist Communism, that dominated almost half of the globe. 
  Communism. World War One, the Russian Revolution, and the electoral successes 
of European socialist parties cemented the division in the world socialist movement 
between Socialist (or Social Democratic) and Communist parties. By the 1920s, the 
former were firmly committed to participation in democratic political processes, and 53 
 
had realized substantial successes. The latter, on the other hand, were dedicated to a 
twofold mission: defending the Soviet Union, and organizing revolutionary movements 
in the capitalist world. 
  The emergence of the Bolshevik wing of the Russian socialist movement as the 
ruling force in the world’s largest country shocked both the capitalist world and the 
socialist movement. By the early 1920s it was clear to both that the Soviet Union was not 
a passing aberration. In the advanced industrial countries, the principal implication was 
that the more extreme elements of the socialist movement were now separate and 
organized into a disciplined, international force under Soviet direction. This was a new 
phenomenon: a global radical movement in control both of a large territory and of 
opposition parties around the world. The emergence of the Soviet Union itself was of 
somewhat less consequence, as it was economically and militarily weak and played 
little role in international politics. But the movement organized by the Soviet-led 
Communist International was a meaningful force in dozens of countries around the 
world, especially after the Depression magnified the miseries that many identified with 
capitalism. 
  Communism was a major political force in only a few industrialized nations, and 
achieved success in none of them. Foremost among these, however, was Germany, the 
troubled centerpiece of interwar European politics. In some southern European 
countries, too, Communists inherited some of the support of previously powerful 54 
 
radical socialist and anarchist movements.47 The strength of the Communists helped 
provoke extreme right-wing reactionary takeovers of government in such countries as 
Italy and Portugal, and led to a decade of conflict and civil war in Spain, ending in an 
even more brutal right-wing authoritarianism. And the polarization of German politics 
certainly contributed to that country’s troubled path. Indeed, the rise of right-wing 
extremism eventually led Communists, in Moscow and elsewhere, to move away from 
insurrection and to search out moderate allies who would cooperate both to defend 
both democracy and the Soviet Union. 
  In the colonial world, Communism had substantially more success. The Soviet 
Union allied itself with anti-colonial activists in the developing world. Hostility 
between the Soviets and other Western powers gave credibility to the Communists’ 
anti-colonial credentials. And the Soviet Union made much of its efforts to create a 
progressive multinational state out of the tsarist prison-house of nations. For many in 
the colonial world, the Soviet Union was represented by the new socialist republics in 
central Asia, among the first regions in the Islamic world to modernize everything from 
the alphabet to the economy. Soon many of the Soviet Union’s supporters were 
prominent in movements against colonialism, and the Soviet Union itself appeared to 
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be a viable alternative to colonial and semi-colonial patterns of economic and political 
development. 
  Communism’s appeal remained somewhat limited through the 1930s. The Soviet 
Union was too weak and isolated, and the Communist movements too far from real 
influence, to have a substantial impact on the political life of the world’s major 
countries.48 Nonetheless, both the socialist homeland and the Communist movement 
came to represent a clear alternative to traditional capitalism and authoritarian fascism. 
The true division of the world between Soviet-style socialism and American-style 
capitalism did not come until after World War Two. 
Contemporary capitalism 
  The capitalist world economic order that emerged after World War Two was 
unprecedented on at least two dimensions. First, its broad outlines were negotiated by 
the major economic powers, largely at meetings held at a resort hotel in Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire. The Bretton Woods system represented an organized and planned 
attempt to reconstitute a functioning, relatively open, international capitalist system. 
Second, world capitalism was confronted by a full-fledged alternative international 
economic order, the world socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. This alternative 
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to capitalism, now stretched from central Europe to Korea, included the world’s most 
populous country, and attracted adherents from all over the colonial world. 
  Enthusiasts: The Bretton Woods compromises. As World War Two wound down, the 
major powers agreed upon the broad contours of the post-war international economy.
49 
Although the system as implemented was different from the plans on paper, its general 
characteristics were roughly as envisioned by Allied policymakers, led by Harry Dexter 
White of the United States and John Maynard Keynes of Great Britain. The post-war 
order was a wide-ranging compromise between the classical open economy of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the emerging welfare states of the 
advanced industrial countries. The arrangements put in place reflected the views of the 
reformist supporters of capitalism who had come to the political forefront in the 1930s, 
and who dominated the “centrist consensus” that reigned for decades after the war 
ended. 
  The core principles of the Bretton Woods system included general commitments 
to international economic integration, to multilateral agreements, to international 
organizations, and to gradualism. The three great Bretton Woods international 
economic institutions covered trade (the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs, or 
GATT, since succeeded by the World Trade Organization or WTO), monetary and 
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financial relations (the International Monetary Fund or IMF) and development (the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or World Bank).
50 
  In trade, the Bretton Woods dedication to trade liberalization was tempered by a 
recognition that some sectors would be too contentious to allow rapid progress. As a 
result, barriers to trade in farm goods were explicitly excluded from the liberalization 
agenda, as was trade in services; developing countries were given wide leeway to 
pursue protectionist measures. In addition, countries were permitted to impose 
temporary trade barriers in response to “dumping,” under circumscribed conditions, 
and more broadly in times of (ill-defined) economic necessity. This gave governments  
leeway to use “escape clauses”  to avoid or postpone politically difficult measures, 
which in turn made it easier for them to participate in the liberalizations GATT 
members were bargaining toward. The reduction  in trade barriers was slow but 
continual, and by the late 1960s trade among the developed countries was roughly as 
free as it had been in the late nineteenth century – and was growing twice as rapidly as 
it had then. 
  The IMF oversaw the construction of a highly modified gold standard, in which 
the U. S. dollar was pegged to gold and other currencies to the dollar. Again, the 
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compromises involved were substantial. The United States could not alter its exchange 
rate, but other countries could and did, as permitted in response to (undefined) 
“fundamental disequilibria.” Capital controls were ubiquitous, as Keynes and White 
had anticipated. The result was a monetary system that provided stability on the 
foreign exchanges, while allowing governments to pursue their own desired monetary 
policies and in particular to engage in demand management as they felt necessary. The 
World Bank, for its part, assisted in rekindling the interest of foreign investors in the 
developing and newly independent countries. In this atmosphere of monetary and 
financial stability, world financial markets and foreign investment grew rapidly. 
  The Bretton Woods system was a great success, as the world economy grew 
more rapidly than ever before. Yet this very success made the system hard to sustain, 
based as it was on compromise. The more integrated the international economy became, 
the harder it got to sustain truly independent national policies. Eventually the 
contradictions of the system caught up with it. In 1971 the monetary order collapsed, to 
be replaced by floating exchange rates. More generally, the major compromises of the 
early post-war period began to come undone as the world economy grew and became 
ever more tightly integrated. Nonetheless, the enthusiasts for capitalism were firmly in 
command of the levers of economic policy in developed countries. Things were not so 
clear in the developing countries, especially among those who had recently freed 
themselves from their colonial ties. 59 
 
  Skeptics: Decolonization and developmentalism  . In the less developed countries 
(LDCs), enthusiasm about classical capitalism faded during the inter-war period. To 
some extent this was due to the sorry record of interwar capitalism itself. From the 
standpoint of the independent LDCs and of many colonies, the entire period from 1914 
until the early 1950s was one in which events in the developed world were largely 
irrelevant or harmful. The industrialized nations were preoccupied with war and 
reconstruction for a decade after 1914. After a brief normalization came the  Depression 
of the 1930s, during which international trade and investment collapsed; and then came 
another decade of preoccupation with war and reconstruction.  
  For nearly forty years, the developing world had little choice but to rely largely 
on its own economic resources. Export markets were depressed or cut off by war, while 
suppliers of manufactured products were often producing for war or reconstruction 
efforts. Even when foreign manufactures were available, the terms of trade deteriorated 
so frequently and substantially that they were priced out of local markets. All this 
created powerful incentives for local entrepreneurs to produce industrial products that 
had previously been imported, largely from Europe or North America. The result was 
rapid industrialization in both the independent developing countries, such as the major 
Latin American nations and Turkey, and in many of the more developed former 
colonies, such as India. 60 
 
  Decolonization gathered speed from the late 1940s onward, even as world trade 
and payments revived (see Austin,  Volume 2: Chapter 3). However, the previous 40 
years’ experience had a powerful impact on the politics of development in both long-
independent and newly-independent developing countries. There were now significant 
industrial sectors in many countries, and the enterprises that had grown up more or less 
immune from foreign competition had little desire to change matters. At the same time, 
political influence had largely passed from the previously dominant export-oriented 
groups – farmers, miners, ranchers – to the urbanizing, industrializing segments of local 
populations. All this was wrapped in a commitment to construct national, and 
nationalist, identities, often in contradistinction to the now reviled colonial and semi-
colonial rulers and their open-economy models.  
  The result was that virtually every LDC turned away from world trade and 
toward the protection and subsidization of domestic industry. The new strategy, 
eventually dubbed “import-substituting industrialization” (ISI), provided support for 
domestic industry that included import barriers, subsidized credit, tax breaks, and 
other policies to replace imports with domestic products. Countries whose economies 
had been strongly oriented toward foreign trade now closed themselves off to many 
imports, and in some instances, to foreign investment as well. ISI often went together 
with substantial state involvement in the economy, with government ownership of 
everything from mines and steel mills to banks and airlines. In many cases, as in India, 61 
 
this inward orientation was associated with Soviet-style planning; in others, it was 
simply a part of nationalist attempts to develop the local market. 
  Nationalist economic policies were typically justified with a bitter criticism of the 
structure of the capitalist international economic order. For some, a new “dependency 
theory” provided some intellectual justification, arguing that global capitalism was 
structurally biased against poor countries. Some insisted that the terms of trade of 
primary producers deteriorated continually, so that following comparative advantage 
was a dead end. Others complained about a world economy whose rules were written 
by the rich. Still others saw multinational corporations and international banks as tools 
of Western imperialism, attempting to continue by economic means the dominance that 
the colonial powers had been forced to give up. In the early 1970s, the LDCs came 
together in international forums to demand a New International Economic Order, a 
reformed international capitalism that served their interests more directly. 
  Developing-country demands for a reform of international capitalism were 
largely ignored by the rich nations. Meanwhile, the semi-autarkic policies of the LDCs 
began to show signs of serious strains. In the early 1980s, a debt crisis hit even the more 
advanced developing countries and revealed some of the real weaknesses of ISI – in 
particular, the difficulties countries pursuing ISI faced in stimulating exports in times of 
difficulty. Over the course of the 1980s, virtually all LDCs jettisoned their previous 
hostility to exports, to world trade, and to international investment, and came to adopt 62 
 
much more open economic models. The developing-country rejection of Western-style 
capitalism was largely dead. 
  Rejectionists: The Soviet bloc. If developing countries were somewhat skeptical 
about the desirability of global capitalism, the Soviet Union and its allies – including 
newly Communist China – were decidedly hostile. The Soviet-led socialist camp was 
now much larger – including Eastern and Central Europe, China, and increasing 
numbers of allies in the developing world. And its members denounced capitalism both 
on principle and in practice. Although the Chinese regime split from the Soviets in the 
early 1960s, it too embraced a powerful rejection of capitalism. 
  The Soviet bloc turned to central planning, which attempted to replace the 
market with strategies devised by the government. Prices were largely divorced from 
considerations of relative scarcity, and used primarily for accounting purposes. 
Resources were allocated centrally, or at least by economic ministries and regions that 
reported to the central government. Essential consumption goods were significantly 
underpriced, which made for constant shortages of them. “Luxury” goods, such as 
electronics and automobiles, were either unavailable or severely rationed. Investment, 
especially in heavy industry, was favored over expansion of the production of 
consumer goods. In the Soviet Union and China, in particular, military needs were 
given priority. 63 
 
  The centrally planned economies achieved rapid growth in the twenty years after 
World War Two, as they drew underutilized resources into production. But Soviet-style 
planning had many limitations. As was true of the import-substituting economies, the 
Soviet bloc found that it increasingly needed imports – not only of food, but of 
technology and precision parts – that it lacked the hard currency to buy. Collectivized 
agriculture proved massively inefficient, forcing the formerly grain-exporting USSR to 
expend scarce foreign currency, year after year, on imported cereals.   Recurrent 
campaigns to increase manufactured exports, particularly from the bloc’s most 
advanced economies (e.g., East Germany), brought little success.  Only the bloc’s raw 
materials and a few artisanal products  found ready purchasers in the West. The 
absence of incentives gave workers and managers little need to monitor quality, or to 
innovate either in the production process or with new products. Over time, the 
industrial plant fell farther and farther behind the technological and quality criteria 
prevailing in the West, and by the 1980s growth had slowed dramatically. With Western 
Europe within easy reach of people in the Soviet bloc’s Central and Eastern European 
nations, it was easy for citizens to see the relative failure of the system. 
  In 1979, the Chinese and Vietnamese regimes both dropped many of their 
commitments to planning and endorsed movement toward a market economy, 
including openness to the rest of the (capitalist) world economy. The Soviet Union and 
its allies attempted a gradual movement toward economic reform, but after 1989 their 64 
 
governments effectively collapsed, and were replaced by new rulers who largely turned 
toward global capitalism. Some of the former component parts of the Soviet Union 
remain reluctant about the capitalist world economy (Belarus and Turkmenistan, for 
example), as do a few Soviet-style regimes in the developing world (Cuba, North 
Korea). But by the early 1990s, central planning as an organized, feasible alternative to 
Western capitalism was of only historical interest.  
  Globalization: “The Washington Consensus.” While the Communist economies 
stagnated, their capitalist rivals experienced new bursts of innovation, productivity, 
and growth.  The 1971 demise of the Bretton Woods system signaled also the developed 
world’s abandonment of capital controls, which in any event had come to be widely 
evaded.  Cross-border investment flourished, and the larger and more mobile pool of 
world capital both encouraged greater risk-taking and, by allowing production to shift 
easily to other jurisdictions, eroded trade-union power.  In the U.S., deregulation of 
such ossified sectors as telecommunications, trucking, and airlines stimulated 
competition, lowered prices, and increased capacity.  
  At the same time, capitalist economies experienced a spate of innovations that, to 
contemporary eyes, seemed lifted from science fiction:  lasers, fiber optics, 
microprocessors that packed first thousands, then millions, now billions of transistors 65 
 
onto a single chip,
51 personal computers, the internet, genetic engineering – and, more 
mundane but perhaps even more important, containerized shipping.52  Productivity of 
labor, land, and intellect all skyrocketed, aided by the far greater global specialization 
that cheaper communication and transportation made possible.   
  As in the nineteenth century, this “second globalization” opened enticing new 
markets for countries and regions.  Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil; Indonesia, 
Malaysia, China, India; almost all of the former Soviet bloc; and, most recently, rapidly 
growing parts of Africa – all abandoned earlier paths of import substitution or central 
planning, now to take their places in the new and ever-changing global division of labor.  
The combination of opening to trade, specialization, foreign investment, and new 
technology often produced economic growth that far surpassed what the “first 
globalization” had achieved.  China, the stellar example, saw its GDP per capita grow 
consistently over thirty years by 8-10 per cent annually, thus doubling on average every 
eight years and increasing 10 to 15-fold over the interval from 1980 to 2010 -- something 
like four times the rate of growth achieved by Germany or Japan in the Nineteenth 
Century. 
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  And this globalization, like its predecessor, generated and sustained its own 
orthodoxy:  no longer the gold standard, but the “Washington consensus,”
53 a 
distillation of what the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the U.S. Treasury, 
and developed-world bankers and officials more generally saw as the magic formula for 
economic growth.  The “consensus” prescriptions involved openness to trade and 
investment, secure property rights, fiscal balance (public debt only to finance 
productive investment, e.g., in infrastructure), a realistic (perhaps even undervalued) 
exchange rate, public spending chiefly on investments in human and physical capital, 
moderate marginal tax rates, privatization of state enterprises, and abolition of stifling 
regulation (e.g., what Indians called the “permit raj”).   
  As with the gold standard a century earlier, the “consensus” rapidly won the 
endorsement of elites around the globe.  Also as before, some countries adopted mildly 
heretical versions of the creed:  China maintained strict capital controls and massively 
undervalued its currency, many of the “Asian tigers” protected infant industries, almost 
everywhere intellectual property remained insecure and agriculture was regarded as a 
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“special case,” coddled in some cases (Korea) but exploited in others (Argentina, much 
of Africa). 
  Often enough, the new orthodoxy achieved remarkable success, most notably in 
some of the former ISI or Communist states (Brazil, Chile, most of Eastern Europe), 
while sometimes the “magic” failed or encountered insuperable resistance (Russia 
under Yeltsin, Mexico in the early years of NAFTA).   The failures, like fallen soufflés, 
invited frenzied inquiries by the leading chefs:  were the cultures incorrigibly anti-
capitalist, were the governments or their subjects recalcitrantly authoritarian or corrupt, 
had there been (as one quip about Russia had it) “too much shock, and too little 
therapy?”  Or even (sotto voce) might the “consensus” somehow be mistaken – not, of 
course, in its main thrust, but in one or another unforeseen detail? 
  Finally, and again in close parallel with the earlier orthodoxy of the gold 
standard, the “consensus” spawned zealots:  in this case, believers in perfectly efficient 
markets, perfectly rational actors, deregulation that compromised even prudential 
supervision of banks or elementary guarantees of public safety.  The market could only 
shower blessings on mankind: there would be rapid and sustained growth, corrupt 
markets would be shunned in favor of honest ones, earnings exactly equal to marginal 
product, and – above all – an accurate pricing and allocation of risk, hence a hitherto 68 
 
unknown smoothing of markets.  In short, no surprises, no bubbles, no slumps.
54  This 
time, indeed, was different.
55  Except that it wasn’t. 
  Globalization and its discontents: The crisis of 2007- . Just as globalization appeared 
triumphant, disaster struck. In 2007 the U.S. economy ran into trouble. After several 
years of growth and a particularly striking expansion in real estate and asset markets, 
housing prices began to fall. This led to distress in an important segment of the 
country’s financial system, the market for mortgage-backed securities and their 
derivatives. Eventually the weakness spread to the entire American financial system, 
causing the modern equivalent of a massive system-wide bank run, and it was 
transmitted immediately to the rest of the world. In early October 2008, it appeared that 
the whole capitalist world was on the brink of a massive financial collapse, as markets 
froze in ways not seen since the 1930s and not imagined by the new orthodoxy.
56 As the 
                                                             
54 That theoretical macroeconomists embraced such beliefs need not have occasioned 
worry.  Unfortunately, among the most fervent adherents of this ultra-orthodox sect 
was Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.  Hence Greenspan took no action to 
deflate the asset bubble (indeed, dismissed the possibility that one existed). 
55 Reinhart and Rogoff 2009. 
56 Famously, Greenspan confessed later in public testimony that he had regarded the 
events with “shocked disbelief.” 69 
 
impact of the financial crisis reverberated throughout the global economy, a Great 
Recession hit.57 
  In most industrial countries, the Great Recession was longer and deeper than any 
experienced since the 1930s, and recovery was slower and more halting. Europe, in fact, 
slid into a second recession in 2012. The problem was a familiar one: dozens of 
countries had accumulated massive debts, including foreign debts, that could not now 
be serviced as contracted. This was in fact the consequence of a strange but historically 
familiar pattern that emerged after 2000, in which one large group of countries came to 
depend upon foreign financing to fuel their economies, while another large group of 
countries came to depend on exports as the engine of their economic growth.
58 The first 
group, those that embarked on a debt-financed consumption boom, included the United 
States, United Kingdom, as well as countries on the periphery of the European Union 
(Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, much of Central Europe, the Baltic states). The second 
group, those whose growth was driven by exports (and lending to the consuming 
countries), included countries in Northern Europe, East Asia, and the oil-producing 
nations. After several years of increasingly feverish borrowing and asset price growth, 
the merry-go-round stopped with a crash in fall of 2008. 
                                                             
57  For a summary, see Chinn and Frieden 2011. 
58 There was an eerie parallel to the 1920s, when the U.S. was the lending nation and 
postwar Europe (especially Germany) was the borrower. 70 
 
  As recovery lagged and unemployment reached, and stayed at, levels not seen 
for decades, dissatisfaction spread at this particular turn of events. As the more serious 
economic problems were in the OECD, most of the political conflict was there as well. 
On the Right, the long crisis inflamed sentiment against immigration, and in some 
quarters against components of the welfare state. On the Left, the crisis provoked 
another round of objections to increasing inequality, and to the alleged inadequacies of 
government regulation of business and finance. Virtually every government in office in 
one of the major debtor nations at the time of the crisis was turned out, and in some 
cases (Greece, Italy) entire political systems were thrown into disarray. 
  In the aftermath of the crisis, world capitalism once again faces difficult 
macroeconomic and distributional issues. As there have always been, there will 
continue to be debates over how best to stimulate and encourage economic recovery 
and growth. There will continue to be conflict over who should be asked to sacrifice to 
restore some vigor to economies that have become stagnant. And there will continue to 
be heated disagreements over the appropriate role of the government in modern 
capitalist economies. 
Conclusions 
  The downturn that began in 2007, severe as it was, simply reminds us of the two 
enduring realities of modern capitalism that provoke antagonism to the system: it is 
prone to recurring crises; and it is associated with a substantial gap between rich and 71 
 
poor. Almost everyone would agree that the benefits of a market economy outweigh the 
costs of its volatility and of the inequality it can breed. But there is massive 
disagreement over how significant both the volatility, and the inequality, are, as 
compared to the creative destruction associated with the capitalist economic order. And 
there is just as much disagreement over how aggressive governments should be in 
attempting to address both the cyclical fluctuations, and the income inequality, that 
characterize capitalism. 
  These issues have been present since capitalism first arose as an integrated 
economic order in early modern Europe. Some, whether as utopian socialists or Soviet-
style Communists, want the state to intervene massively to dampen both fluctuations 
and inequality – at the expense of capitalism’s ability to increase productivity and 
generate economic expansion. Others, from state capitalists to fascists, also want the 
state to intervene, albeit not so much to reduce inequality as to squelch dissent and 
compel investment. Orthodox enthusiasts of modern capitalism express confidence that 
the system can, and will, largely look after itself. Wherever the truth may lie, there 
seems little doubt that so long as capitalism is with us, so too will be conflict over 
whether it should be preserved, and if so, how. 
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